Honest Expression vs. Audience Responsibility

I always get a bit bored waiting to teach my late afternoon class, since I’ve done most everything that I can do (lies!) between now and then. As good a time as any to write on the blog.

A good friend of mine sent me this link where Stephen Fry argues that British people are more into having robust arguments than Americans. The author of the linked blog post tends to agree with Fry, and in a why that is almost comical itself. He relates the story of a dinner with very religious attendees where he decides to announce that he doesn’t think God exists. Here’s the best quote:

But looking back, why should I have felt bad about saying what I honestly felt and which was not a personal attack on any one? I had not called anyone an idiot or punched them in the face. All I had said to a group of religious people was that I did not believe that god existed.

His choice to voice his view is defended by a strange, albeit implicit, philosophy. He seems to see argument as based on an intrensic, knowable, and internal good intent/belief that should be expressed. He is confused why this upsets his listeners as he did not verbally or physically assault them. All he had “merely” done is present living proof that their belief system wasn’t true.


That’s all. Oh wait. . .that’s pretty serious. Unfortunately this person is governed by an impoverished theory of language’s role in our lives. It’s an unfortunate, yet common idea that somehow honesty and directness not only trump your responsibility toward others in argument, but are better ethically than that responsibility.

It’s a real disadvantage to our communicative opportunities when people approach situations of argument, claim and response, or discussion from the point of view that language and words are not real, that they are secondary in intensity and scope, and that they are inert and harmless expressions of a reality kept elsewhere. Ignorance of the role that words and language play in the co-construction and negotiation of our shared social reality inevitably lead to moments that, although are not physically violent, are violent none the less. Since he didn’t punch anyone, why are people upset with him? Perhaps he did symbolically punch them. He failed to adapt what he was saying for the audience he was addressing. If one honestly feels they should express themselves by swinging their arms and they punch someone inadvertently, they should apologize.

Why should he feel bad about making others feel bad when he honestly expresses his belief? Perhaps its because somewhere he recognizes the importance of style in ones argument. Without it, a simple claim about a belief can be seen as a devastating personal attack, shutting down the interlocutor’s ability to see a point in continuing the argument. When one effectively argues, attention must be paid to both management of the persuasive moment as well as the quality of argument and refutation. What baffles me is how he can feel wronged when his statement that God does not exist could easily be interpreted as a direct personal attack on his listeners’ belief system.
This brings up the first responsibility in any general argument – your fidelity should be toward making the persuasive moment sustainable, keeping open the possibility for assent to your claim by careful attention to your ethical treatment of your listener/audience/opponent.

Of course, none of this applies in formal debate, which is why formal debate is such a bad model for how to argue informally. In a formal debate, the first responsibility is gone concerning your opponent. But in terms of the judge or audience, that obligation still rests on you. As a novice many of us probably automatically addressed our arguments to our opponent, but were quickly corrected to address arguments to the audience, or judges. This is the first step in the recognition of this important obligation.

Our noble scientist here is legitimately perplexed why the expression of his belief made others uncomfortable. It is because he was inattentive to this obligation. Since he clearly knew that his audience was deeply religious, what could be served by making such a huge, harsh statement? Perhaps he felt good about expressing his view. One must serve the argumentative situation as much as serving conviction in order to be effective.

An argumentation model that proposes no apologies for expressing honest belief is not a very good one. It is a model that gets many shouting voices without rejoinder. Adaptation of one’s honest belief into a form that can facilitate some molding, working with, or even some desire to entertain the idea seems necessary.
Of course there will be moments where incommensurability appears. But we shouldn’t invite those moments with our first utterance. This poor guy needs to recognize that words can be as violent as a punch (and I think he somewhat does since “calling someone an idiot” is immediately mentioned as well). In these cases, the ethic is one where you know that the expression will hurt the other person, but they must hear it. These cases are somewhat rare, and are often twisted into justifications to pronounce one’s beliefs honestly and directly without care for the listener.
Maintaining that liminal potentially persuasive space is incredibly important if one wants to engage in productive argumentation like Stephen Fry seems to want as he’s quoted in that post. But if you want grandstanding and to make yourself feel better about your ideas, go with honest and direct pronouncement. The trick to good argumentation is nuance and attentiveness to every moment, not worry about the metaphysics of “good argument” or fidelity to some ancient moral subjectivity of laying bare the soul no matter the effect. The view of argument from rhetoric is one of negotiation, which comes with it the most important postulate – that when advancing a belief one risks giving it up if the rejoinder is persuasive enough. One puts oneself on the line quite literally in an argument – and such openness should be treated with care.

Rejecting the “Righteous Four”

Doing some last-minute preparation before our departure for New Haven in the morning for the Yale IV, which generally involves printing out maps, train schedules, hotel confirmation numbers and tax exemption forms. Prepping for a tournament is pretty easy after doing so many so close together – one of the things about adjusting to BP style is the run-up to the big tournament happens in the fall, since Worlds is held over the Winter intercession. This means spring is lighter in feeling, even though the U.S. Nationals is an important tournament. But it’s not the same as the October-December blast of tournaments. In policy debate, the run-up ends either in February/March, when the regional qualifiers for the NDT are held, or CEDA nationals, or perhaps both depending on your preferences and your orientation to and within debate.
One big difference was pretty clearly pointed out to me in a couple of conversations I had surrounding the Hart House tournament at The University of Toronto. This was a fabulous tournament, but a few American debaters started a conversation about how wrong it was that they might have been forced into taking positions they found morally offensive. They were ok with losing though because their arguments were “right.” I call this idea the “theory of the righteous four.”
This theory postulates that it’s not only fine, but morally acceptable to get ranked a four in a debate where you, by virtue of your position on the table, had to say or engage in argumentation that you find morally or ethically objectionable from your own political views. If you (rightly) refuse to engage, you will get ranked four. But that’s ok, because you are on the side of justice, rightness, virtue, and many other noble truths in life.
When I first came to coach in the Northeastern U.S. in 2001, I first encountered this idea. I found it baffling – a bizarre at best, unhealthy at worst conflation of speech in debate and personal politics. The best description I mustered to myself at the time was that it was a simple logical fallacy – substitution of effect for cause – that made people think, “because she’s saying this she must believe it.” But surely, only the most rank amateur would believe such a post hoc. But there were a number of students around the circuit that would say to me during the criticism, “Don’t you dare indict my voice.” The conflation of debate with personal advocacy I found then to be confusing and dangerous, and I believe the same thing now.
First, it’s a fallacy – probably a good idea to reject “effect for cause” reasoning. But the more critical claim at work here is the political function of a debate tournament. If you believe that debate is important because it is one of the last places where every idea can be treated on its merits with fair, critical evaluation then you have to accept, I think, that occasionally you will have to inhabit ideas that are not your own. These ideas are not always better ideas than your own; they can easily be ideas that you have had, or that you entertained and rejected on ethical or moral grounding. But either way, you should still embody them again, and in a manner that is not a straw dog, but a serious, strategic attempt at defending the idea.
The reason why is in service to debate as a whole. Good ideas glimmer more when the light of their alternative is present. Better, more persuasive accounts of thoughtful ideas can be crafted if someone smart is taking the other, more insidious side. Everyone benefits if a fair, persuasive attempt to represent all appropriate (read: kairotic) arguments are attempted in the debate. Relevancy and attention to nuance must be considered as well. In the end, the benefits of debate are extended when the debate is handled for the sake of debate, and not individual personal politics.
Here is what happens under the “righteous four” model – all of the discourse in debate shifts to the left. Instead of developing insights into argumentation that has a large representation in the public, the discourse becomes about “out-lefting” one another. If nobody will inhabit the “reprehensible” ground, then no chance appears for understanding why an argument we believe to be a priori “evil” would ever find assent. I would also suggest that those who refuse to take up objectionable positions within debates ensure a future of assent to those same reprehensible positions – they intellectually disarm all participants in the round from valuable defensive practice against such ideas. Just because you don’t prefer a certain weapon doesn’t mean that you should forgo training in how to defend yourself from that weapon.
A great example of this is the recent Hart House IV final round – This house would not contact undiscovered human populations. After a fairly good proposition case was established, the Opening Opposition speaker stood up and did something incredible – the first words out of her mouth were, “Madam Speaker, we kinda like exploitation.” Brilliant. Is it because it’s offensive? Because it’s rejected by modern conceptions of the good, liberal politics and the like? Is it because it advocates violence and mayhem and that’s cool? Not any of these. It’s because it is an argument that is both relevant and contains the potential for great intellectual investigation within the context of this debate.
The debate was framed around the idea that contact, historically, leads to exploitation. I think it is intellectually responsible in the service of debate to offer the idea that exploitation is a situational term. Politically, this loaded language can do a number on an audience. It is up to the skilled debater to give it the nuance and articulation it needs to become a believable point. Is it really exploitative in all cases? Is the connection definitely solid? And in which instances would we prefer “exploitation” over the alternative of no contact whatsoever? These are the major clash points that arise from entertaining an idea that many, especially those in the academy fields of anthropology, sociology and others would find to be a repugnant position. Everything hinges on the definition, and the nuance of the speaker in establishing that definition and its limit.
Unfortunately, the speaker backed off of pursuing this line of reasoning possibly due to the laughter and reaction of the audience. But it’s a shame she did. I think they could have won with a careful analysis of what this means, instead of the fear of a neo-liberal “bad word” can generate. “You said a dirty word” is not that persuasive a reason to reject someone, unless you are a High School teacher.
In certain debate communities, such as NPDA and American Policy debate, you can find regions where people do occupy ground where, if the audience is unskilled in the basics of debate practice, their personal view might be mistaken for their advocacy. I think we in the BP community want to provide the same excellent tradition of switch-side argumentation that these other communities have provided. Avoiding the sentimentally nice idea that “I lost because I refuse to compromise my principles” is a very important step in the service to much larger principles of intellectual rigor, argumentative development, and persuasive realism – all of which serve the members of the community in their development not as political radicals, but something much better: Moderates who critically examine public discourse and are not afraid to entertain the idea that they might not know it all, they might need more information, and more time might be needed to figure out what’s best – all of which work very well in the service of pluralistic democracy.

Argumentation Books I Can’t Do Without

Chatting with a friend of mine online the other day and he asked me for my favorite argumentation\debate books. Thought I would list them here as well.

Here’s the list I came up with:

The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation by Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca

A masterwork, read it only 2 times all the way through because it is both massive and technical. Many of the examples don’t resonate with modern American readers since they are all mid 20th century European social science or literary examples. And many of them are somewhat obscure even if you think you are pretty well-read.

The plus sides of the book far outweigh. Here is a comprehensive attempt to map in totality the common topoi of contemporary argument from a purely inductive basis. No discursive stone is left unturned – philosophy, courtrooms, literature, sociology, and more are examined for the presence of the new rhetorical forms.

If the book intimidates, check out Perelman’s later book The Realm of Rhetoric for a boiled down approach to what is in the Treatise.

Uses of Argument by Stephen Toulmin

Essential, game-changing study for rhetoricians that study argumentation. For philosophers or others who study argument, the book is not so revolutionary. For people involved in academic debate or intercollegiate debate, the Toulmin model is almost not a model, but the right way that arguments are made.

More important of a contribution, I think, is the situatedness of argument that Tolumin suggests. The idea that argumentation is field dependent is a vital concept that places real importance on the method of argument over the truth of the argument. This allows for evaluation of argument away from tools from empirical science, or analytic philosophy.

Informal Logic by Douglas Walton

This is a nice treatment of the formal, validity-based discipline of logical reasoning in the terms of the Toulmin turn, or the turn toward the study of argument that has some resonance with the daily practice of argument. One critique that can be lodged at philosophers who study argumentation is that there’s too much theory, not enough practice in their analysis. Not a lot of discussion of the daily practices of argument and the way people reason in and out of arguments all day long. This book bridges the gap between the situatedness study of rhetoricians and the theoretical structures of the philosophers interested in argument.

Rhetorical Argumentation by Christopher Tindale

A great attempt at looking through the eyes of argumentation studies at rhetoric, and then at argumentation studies through rhetoric’s eyes. A wonderful read, very lucid, and with plenty of ideas for praxis between the two fields. The idea of argument as object in recent years, brought about by many field’s attention to argumentation, finds some needed complication in the pages of this good book.

But these are scholarly treatments of argument! What about teaching it to debaters or potential debaters?

I always havethe Art of Deception by Capaldi hanging around. Great intro to formal reasoning, critical thinking, emotional appeals, formal fallacies, and causal reasoning. Cheap and easy to read with tons of examples and exercises. A fantastic book for anyone interested in improving his or her argumentative skill.

Also perhaps Argumentation Schemes by Walton might be good for teaching, but it’s fairly technical and complex, and mostly for argument analysis. But there are some good ways in that book of breaking down arguments into structural forms or elements just to see how they work.

Pedagogy of Skillful Means

My body seems to know when I have weekends off from debate and schedules all my illnesses for those times. Yesterday and today I’ve been fighting a nasty cough and not really feeling motivated to do much of anything. I’m about to take my laundry down in a few, and I went grocery shopping yesterday, but that’s about all I can handle for now.

I’ve been working on my larger project of attempting to find a non-rational, non-propositional justification for academic debate since I can’t do much else but sit around, and I came across the wonderful concept from Zen Buddhism of “skillful means.” What I’ve been researching is the koan (kung-an) as a pedagogical method. What I’ve found so far is that it suggests a rhetoric of teaching and learning quite different from what’s in vogue right now.

Here is Thich Nhat Hanh describing it, in relation to kung-ans:

The kung-an is a useful instrument in the work of awakening, just as a pick is a useful instrument in working on the ground. What is accomplished from working on the ground depends on the person doing the work and not just on the pick. The Kung-an is not an enigma to resolve; this is why we cannot exactly say that it is a theme or subject of meditation. A kung-an is only a skillful means to help a practitioner reach his or her goal. – Zen Keys, 57.

The koan, or kung-an is a tool that helps the student work independently on another problem – the problem of understanding. It is not a thesis, or main idea, or “curriculum.” It’s not a clever intro. I think it is a rhetorical “wedge” that allows the field of “to be understood” to be “mined/mind” (Going with the metaphor here). The metaphor suggests that as a tool it is only as good as the skill of the person who is wielding it. It must be crafted to the particulars of the situation of master/student, then it becomes “merely” skillful means.


So skillful means are a trick? Some sort of clever educational activity? Hanh goes a bit further with it:


To help practitioners cross the river to the shore of awakening, Zen masters hold out the staff of skillful means. But the disciple must grab hold of it. If his eyes remain shut and his mind blocked, the practitioner will miss the staff. (72)

I find this entire discussion fascinating, as it appears to line up with a clearly conservative pedagogy – the blame lies with the student if he or she can’t “grasp the staff of skillful means.” The student has to see it, realize what it is, and grab onto it. If he or she doesn’t, well then, that’s tough. Or perhaps they are not smart enough.


But “skillful means” cuts both ways. The phrase suggests that the means deployed are chosen, refined, calculated, and (most importantly) produced by the master. The master is making a judgement as to what “skillful means” to extend. It is his or her choice, and to extend the exact same means to all students is to fail one’s pedagogical ethic.

A master must know the mentality of his disciple well in order to propose a kung-an that is appropriate. Every master meets success sometimes, but also knows failure when he proposes an inappropriate kung-an. (61)

Clearly the failure is not the student’s all the time. The master must use a “skillful means” that is rhetorically appropriate – it must be recognizable as help for the student. This is the opposite interpretation we get of Zen practice from popular culture, where the master must offer puzzle within puzzle that the student (near the end of the film) recognizes as simple liberal modernism, and finds within his heart the strength to push on toward his uncontroversial quest to eliminate two-dimensional evil from the world (normally with a flying kick).

Negotiation and discrimination are also a part of the rhetoric of Zen pedagogy. If the kung-an is the instrument handed to the student for his or her own labor toward understanding, then the master must be careful not to give it too early or late, and also must make sure the student stays interested long enough to reach the moment of “skillful means.” However, “skillful means” could be extended to describe the rhetoric of the entire master/student relationship, which at first glance appears Hegelian, but I don’t think it fits. There is a different economy at play here, and I think it’s one of the elimination of any fixed points from which one could identify with the opposite term. Instead, Zen masters attempt through “skillful means” the recognition that one is always already “master” and always already “student.” The distinction between the two terms is something that can count as a “skillful means,” but it is clearly the opposite of the goal of Zen practice. This is why Hanh usually uses the adjective “mere” when describing it.

As for debate, do we use “skillful means” to extend assistance to students? Or do we toss one ladder in the water and hope they find it?

Do we take responsibility for the students’ failure to understand, or do we recognize our failure to provide “skillful means” for the topos “to be understood.”

How much time do we waste trying to explain to students “here is the finger, the finger is very important, we must always look to the finger, the finger will show you the way,” when the moon shines brightly just above our head?

LOL Scientists

Someone wrote a book on the paranormal! Sadly though, the author of this article feels that it’s shocking to know that in the book these phenomena (ooooh? What? what??) are real.

It’s so funny and annoying at the same time when smart people approach a complex phenomenon – let’s say the paranormal and the realm of the psychic – and then conclude something totally beside the point. Well, beside any sort of interesting point that we humans could do something with.

Please answer me this question: Why do all of our supposedly most insightful investigations feel that announcing that something is “real” or “really works” is a conclusion?
What about its implication, meaning, role in the social, cultural, political? What about it as a phenomenon and what it says about identity, humanity, the other, the economic? Wasn’t your investigation started because the phenomenon, as such, existed? Isn’t that “real?”
I just don’t understand how anyone can be satisfied with the claim “it’s really real” being synonymous with insight.
But then again, I don’t understand why the tools of scientific investigation (objectivity, experimentation) have been globalized to the point where one has difficulty imagining an alternative way of “finding out” that would be considered legitimate.